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The struggling little nation, exhausted by its fight for inde-
pendence, faced a world wedded to the mercantilist policy. Free-
dom carried with it heavy responsibilities in the world of trade.
The United States was now a foreign nati6n subject to every
restriction the monopolistic organizations of England could pro-
cure from parliament designed to check the commerce of com-
peting nations. Hostile legislation was directed specifically at
the American nation. The great trade of the Americans with
the British West Indies which had existed for many years, was
seriously injured by an order in council adopted in 1783, pro-
viding that the trade between the United States and these is-
lands must be carried on British ships, owned and navigated by
British subjects. American ships trading with England could
only bring in articles produced in the states of which their owrn-
ers were citizens. The design of such legislation was to force
American trade into British hands and to destroy American
shipping which had grown strong before the Revolution. It v'as
thought that the application of stern economic measures such
as these would convince the thirteen struggling little sovereign-
ties of the futility of attempting to combat the severe restrictive
legislation of the great nations, and thus cause them to seek to
re-establish their allegiance to the British empire. John Adams
who was sent over to negotiate a commercial treaty was ridi-
culed. He threatened reprisals without effect. "I should be
sorry," he said, "to adopt a monopoly, but, driven to the neces-
sity of it, I would not do things by halves. . . . If monopo-
lies and exclusions are the only arms of defense against monopo-
lies and exclusions, I would venture upon them." 2
But the English government knew it was dealing with a weak
disorganized government of thirteen independent states work-
ing at cross purposes, and under such conditions threats were
futile. English tradesmen could evade individual state regula-
tions, but American traders could not escape the English restric-
tions. The British trading companies and merchants mean-
while poured their low priced goods into the country and the
small American factories created during the war were faced
with ruin. The states individually attempted to regulate com-
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merce, and adopted different retaliatory measures against Eng-
lish goods, but the lack of uniformity in duties merely diverted
the flow of commodities to the states which imposed low duties
or no duties. This quickly aroused jealousy between the states.
The states then began commercial warfare against each other.
Heavy duties were imposed, boycotts were declared and some
states were on the verge of warfare.
The breakdown of the trade structure which had for so many
years supported the commerce between the colonies and the
mother country itself produced misery and depression every-
where. An orgy 6f paper money soon demoralized trade, and
forced business back to the slow primitive processes of barter.
The abnormal risks of doing business created a great group of
speculators willing to assume the risk, who so aroused Wash-
ington's ire that he said he would like to hang them on a gal-
lows higher than that of Haman.2 Chaos ruled in trade.
The attitude of New Jersey in reluctantly entering the Con-
federacy because of the lack of power in Congress over trade'
was vindicated by the course of events. Serious thinking men
began to see the compelling need for a centralized government
to control interstate and foreign trade. In 1778 New Jersey had
addressed a resolution to the Continental Congress urging that
the national government should regulate foreign trade.4 Three
years later a resolution was presented in Congress affirming that
"it is indispensably necessary that the United States in congress
assembled should be vested with a right of superintending the
commercial regulations of every state, that none may take place
that shall be partial or contrary to the common interest." r In
1785 a committee of Congress reported that Congress ought to
possess the sole and exclusive power of regulating trade with
foreign nations and between the states6 In 1786 Virginia
adopted resolutions inviting all of the states to appoint com-
missioners to meet in Annapolis "to take into consideration the
trade of the United States, to consider how far an uniform sys-
tem in their commercial regulations may be necessary to their
common interests and their permanent harmony." I The repre-
sentatives of five states met at" Annapolis in the fall, and sent
out a call for a constitutional convention the following year.
After several states had chosen delegates to the convention, the
Continental Congress gave its approval to the plan and the con-
2 Ibid. 164.
3MTADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Hunt and
Scott's ed. 1920) 106.
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vention which was destined to create the Constitution of the
United States met in Philadelphia in 1787. Certainly there was
ground for the following statement of Webster in his great
argument before the Supreme Court of the United States :'
"Over whatever other interests of the country, this govern-
ment may diffuse its benefits and its blessings, it will always be
true as a matter of historical fact, that it had its immediate
origin in the necessities of commerce; and for its immediate ob-
ject, the relief of those necessities, by removing their causes and
by establishing a uniform and steady system."
FEDERAL CONTROL UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
The Constitution vested in Congress the power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes." 1 At one stroke it largely freed
interstate and foreign commerce from the restrictions which had
been imposed by the states. And it created one great central
government to act in behalf of the business interests of the
country in the bitter competition waged by the different nations
in international trade. Congress quickly wielded this power.
The first important statute enacted by Congress imposed tariff
duties and allowed a discount of 10% of such duties on goods
imported in ships built and owned by American citizens.'
Freed from English control, the new nation was now able to
attack the monopolies of the great English foreign trading com-
panies and in this same act struck at the East India Company,
by making the duty on tea brought from India in American ves-
sels less than one-half that imposed if transported in foreign
vessels, and levied high duties on tea bought from the East In-
dia Company in Europe even if transported to the United States
in an American vessel. America's shipovners had for several
years been encroaching on the trade of the East India Company,
and in a few years developed a heavy commerce successfully
breaking its monopoly. Foreign trade was by far the most
important trade of the country at this time, and the first regu-
lations of Congress were directed primarily toward the stimula-
tion and protection of our foreign commerce. The tariff was
imposed more to compel the removal of restrictions of foreign
nations in our foreign trade than to develop domestic industry.
Our foreign trade was surpassed only by that of England among
the nations of the world, although it was of course almost en-
tirely in raw materials and foodstuffs.
The Revolution as well as the conditions of pioneer life caused
8 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 12 (U. S. 1824).
9 U. S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, par. 3.
10 (1789) 1 Stat. 25, 27.
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Americans to believe in complete liberty of individual action.
Adam Smith in his epochal book, The Wealth of Nations, pub-
lished in 1776, which formulated the laissez faire theory as to
the relations between government and industry, epitomized the
powerful sentiment of the English people against the govern-
mental restrictions which strangled freedom of trade and delib-
erately fostered monopoly. This sentiment was thoroughly in
accord with the ideals of American democracy. The innumerable
interferences of government in England with the processes of
business, which were designed to foster and protect monopolies
rather than to create and preserve competition, had so aroused
the antagonism of that slow acting people that even they ulti-
mately discarded the policy of complete government control. The
colonists had gone to war over the commercial restrictions im-
posed upon them by England's government for the benefit of
privileged, monopolistic groups of English traders and manu-
facturers. The natural reaction in America was against the
grant of any power to a central government which might re-
create such a condition and only the overwhelming force of
events under the Confederacy convinced the people of the neces-
sity for granting the power of regulation to the national govern-
ment. The deep seated hostility of the people toward monopoly
was imbedded not only in the common law of England as adopted
by the states, but also in several state constitutions.
Miserable roads and sectional jealousies at thig time made in-
terstate trade negligible except between the larger cities. Trade
consisted basically of two great branches: (1) the extraction of
raw materials and production of foodstuffs, and their collection
for exportation, (2) the distribution of manufactured articles from
abroad. The great agency of trade was the country store which
bartered the manufactured goods of Europe for the export prod-
ucts of its community. In the small communities these stores
often, possessed a monopoly of trade, sometimes forcing groups
of neighbors to organize market trips to larger towns to ex-
change their products for'the commodities needed by them.1
New York, the chief city of the nation, had only a population
of about 33,000 in 1790. Manufacturing was negligible, most of
the necessities being produced by the versatile pioneers in their
own homes. This ability of the people to supply most of their
own needs, as well as the absence of large manufacturing estab-
lishments, freed the people from any serious danger of monopoly
except of foodstuffs in the local towns and city markets. That
the people would act to protect themselves against local abuses
was to be expected. Washington, the newly established capital,
following the principle of the old forestalling statutes, in 1802
adopted an ordinance making it unlawful for any person "to
'11 DAY, A HISTORY OF COMMERCE (rev. ed. 1923) 488.
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buy up any provision or article of food coming to the markets,"
and as late as 1826 a prosecution was brought under this ordi-
nance. 2 Town regulations of markets were general in the
southern states and Augusta, Georgia, as late as 118, prohibited
engrossing, forestalling and regrating.2  Town ordinances were
generally adopted fixing the weight and price of bread. The
northern colonies for years had likewise had similar statutes and
ordinances in effect, which were of real value until improved
agencies of transportation brought in outside competition-a
more effective agency for holding down prices than laws or ordi-
nances.
In the early history of our nation a far greater menace to the
freedom of interstate trade came from acts of states than from
the action of any individuals or combinations. George Clinton,
a bitter, hard-fighting reactionary-governor of New York and
enemy of the Constitution, believed firmly in the old mercantil-
ist theory to which foreign nations still clung, and endeavored to
administer the affairs of New York in this selfish spirit. The
state legislature, in line with his ideas, had granted to Robert R.
Livingston and Robert Fulton a monopoly of the navigation of all
waters within the jurisdiction of the state, with boats moved by
fire or steam, for a fixed period of years. The grant did not in-
clude sailing vessels. Aaron Ogden, their assignee, asked the
state court to grant an injunction against one Thomas Gibbons
restraining him from operating two steamboats running from
certain points in New York and New Jersey. An injunction was
granted by the lower state court and affirmed by the highest court
of the state, and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of
the United States. Congress had prior to this time enacted sev-
eral laws regulating navigation, including one for the licensing
of vessels to carry on the coast trade between the several states-.
The case was of great importance, for Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Georgia and Tennessee had all
granted similar monopolies between 1813 and 1819. Water
transportation -was becoming of vast importance to the future
of the country, for the invention of the steamboat was besjn-
ning to make our rivers great arteries of commerce.
Great lawyers such as Webster and Emmett participated in
the argument. It was pointed out that if a state could create a
monopoly barring vessels from other states, it could create a
monopoly of trade excluding from its territory interstate and
foreign commerce. From an economic standpoint the case was
one of the most important ever before the Supreme Court of the
United States just as it is a landmark in the history of American
constitutional law. Chief Justice Marshall in 1824 delivered the
.12 Botelor v. Washington, Fed. Cas. No. 1685 (1826).
33 THE SOUTH IN THE BUMIrNG OF THE NATION (1909) 477.
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opinion of a unanimous court. To the contention that commerce
as used in the commerce clause of the Constitution meant merely
the traffic in commodities involved in their purchase, sale and
interchange, he answered that "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic,
but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the com-
mercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in
all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for car-
rying on that intercourse." After holding that navigation came
within such a definition,14 he continued, "This power, like all
others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than
are prescribed in the Constitution." 15 The Constitution, it was
held, was the supreme law of the land, and any state law incon-
sistent with it was null and void. The New York law was there-
fore held to be repugnant to the commerce clause of the Consti-
tution in so far as it prohibited vessels licensed according to the
laws of the United States from navigating the waters of the
state of New York. Thus the great principle was established
that state governments could not exclude interstate commerce
from their confines by the granting of monopolistic privileges to
their own citizens, and that Congress had supreme power over
interstate and foreign commerce. Repeatedly from that day to
this the Supreme Court has been compelled to reaffirm that prin-
ciple when efforts have been made by the states to restrict or
burden interstate commerce. The economic importance of the
decision in establishing the freedom of interstate commerce from
innumerable state restrictions of unreasonable and conflicting
character can not be overemphasized. Over a vast territory, in
a field of commerce destined to attain dimensions beyond the
imagination, the principle of freedom of trade under uniform
and reasonable regulation was established.
Interstate commerce rapidly increased during the first half of
the 19th century. The European wars and the War of 1812
greatly stimulated manufacturers, and the improvement of trans-
portation through the building of roads and canals even before
the construction of railroads enlarged the field of distribution of
the factory. In the court records of the states we begin to find
evidences of combinations and monopolistic devices which pre-
saged the development of a national problem. Attention was
early directed toward combinations among carriers whose im-
partial service at reasonable rates is so essential to the life of
trade. In 1847 an agreement among boat owners in New York
to fix rates and divide net earnings was held null and void as a
14 Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 8, at 189.
IS Ibid. 196.
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conspiracy to commit an act "injurious to trade and commerce"
within the meaning of a state statute.6
In 1855, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that an act
of the Colonial Assembly in 1766, which granted the right to
erect a bridge over a certain stream and forbade the erection
of any bridge or ferry within six miles thereof, was in violation
of the express provision of the state constitution against mono-
poly. 17 Four years later the highest court of Louisiana held
an agreement among members of a trade association to refrain
from selling any India cotton bagging for a period of three
months, except with the consent of the majority of the members,
to be a combination to enhance prices in restraint of trade and
therefore unenforceable." In 1S62 an agreement among salt
manufacturers to lease their salt blocks to a single company as a
means of controlling and increasing prices, was held to be void
by the New York courts because made for an illegal purpose.1
And the following year the Supreme Court of Kentucky held an
agreement between members of a railroad association to carry
no freight at less than a fixed price was invalid as against public
policy.-o
AFTER THE CIVIL WAR
The close of the Civil War brought in a new epoch in American
economic history. That great struggle irrevocably created one
social and economic system where before tvo had existed. It
definitely established the power of the federal government. The
great expansion of industry during the war to meet war demands
supplied a great industrial organization eager to develop new
fields of distribution. The development of machine production
made the growth of large business units inevitable. The rapid
construction of railroads over the continent during and immedi-
ately following the war furnished the essential agency for the
cheap and wide distribution of commodities and for welding the
nation into a vast economic unit. Wave after wave of settlers
drove the frontier toward the Pacific, and consumed the best
of the free public lands. The rich resources of the west were
tapped. Banking and other instrumentalities of trade were
quickly strengthened and stabilized. The groundwork was laid
for a great expansion of trade and commerce. With free land
vanishing, the economic independence of the individual w.,as
16 Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio, 349 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1847).
7 "McRee v. Wilmington R. R., 47 N. C. 186 (1855).
"Ls Indian Bagging Ass'n v. Kock, 14 La. Ann. 164 (1859).
"9 Clancey v. Onondaga Fine Salt Manufacturing Co., G2 Barb. W95 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1862).
20 Sayre v. Louisville Union Ass'n, 1 Duv. 143 (Ky. 1863).
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circumscribed. He became inevitably a part of the great
economic organization of the nation, and the direct effects of its
operation he could no longer escape. Classes began to stratify.
Class feeling began to develop. Both courts and legislatures
began to feel the insistent demand of great masses of the people
for the regulation and control of the industrial machinery of the
country.
The overproduction of articles resulting from the war expan-
sion of industries created a surplus of goods which caused a
heavy decline in prices. Lump coal, for example, dropped from
$7.86 in 1865 to $3.86, and the worried operators entered into
agreements to restrict production and similar combinations."
The over-expanded business enterprises seeking to control com-
petition by private agreement soon came into conflict with the
long established principles of the common law in effect in the
several states. In 1868 the courts of Pennsylvania held an agree-
ment between two or more persons to forestall the market for
any necessity of life by the employment of falsehood disclosing
a motive of mischief toward individuals or the public was in-
dictable.
22
There quickly developed a considerable body of decisions of the
state courts dealing with trade restraints. Broadly speaking,
the restraints condemned by the courts were of three classes (a)
restraints imposed in connection with the sale of business, (b)
restraints voluntarily imposed by competitors to restrict com-
petition between themselves and (c) restraints effected through
common ownership or control. The first group it is not im-
portant to consider here.23 The second group of restraints i.e.,
agreements between competitors to restrict competition among
themselves, through such devices as agreements to fix prices, to
divide territory, to limit production and the like, were frowned
on by the courts, which held such agreements to be void and
unenforceable as against public policy.24 The third group in-
cluded more indirect methods to restrict competition through
common ownership or control. Among these methods which
were condemned by the state courts may be mentioned such
practices as the acquisition by one corporation of the shares of
21 JONES, THE ANTHRACITE COAL COMBINATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1914) c. III.
22 Commonwealth v. Tack, 1 Brewst. 511 (Pa. 1868).
23 For a full discussion of this type of restraints, see DAvIEs, TRUST LAWS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (1915) 26 ff.
24 See, for example, Santa Clare Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 76 Calif. 387, 1S
Pac. 391 (1888) ; Chicago Gas Co. v. Peoples Gas Co., 121 Ill. 530, 13 N. E.
169 (1887) ; Anderson v. Jett, 89 Ky. 375, 12 S. W. 670 (1889) ; Stanton v.
Allen, 5 Denio, 434 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1848); Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay
Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871).
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another ;25 agreements for the surrender of control of competing
concerns to a trustee or trustees, who are thus able completely
to control competitive policies of all such concerns ;: and corpo-
rate consolidations formed for monopolistic purposes.27
While state courts under the common law developed a sub-
stantial body of decisions dealing with many forms of trade
restraints, these decisions for the most part merely denied the
right of remedy in the courts to parties participating in such
agreements, thus making such arrangements unenforceable
between the parties, or established the right of the state to com-
pel the surrender of the corporate charters of such combinations.
Because of the inadequacy of the common law, legislatures and
Congress also quickly felt the pressure resulting from the chang-
ing conditions following the Civil War. At first, during the
seventies, the resentment of the people was directed chiefly to-
ward the railroads. The railroads had constructed pioneer lines
at heavy expense in virgin territory where the light volume of
traffic could not support the costs of operation. Under such
circumstances competition to secure what traffic was available
tended to force rates below costs which inevitably led to rate
fring agreements, pools and similar practices. In competition
for tonnage, gross discriminations were practiced between ship-
pers and between communities. Railroad executives considered
their roads strictly as private enterprises, entitled to complete
freedom from government interference, and not only disregarded
the rights of the public but also did not hesitate to exert im-
proper influences on state legislators to protect what they felt
to be their rights. The farmers throughout the middle west
who found it difficult to move their crops to the east at a profit,
developed a deep-seated hostility towards the railroads because
of what they felt to be excessive and discriminatory rates. Huge
promotion schemes, watered stock, graft and the corruption of
government officials made an ugly chapter in American hiistory.
3
In 1867 the Patrons of Husbandry, an agricultural association
of farmers, more popularly known as the Grange was formed.-3
This organization had an amazingly rapid growth. Its activities
were varied and directed toward improving the general con-
ditions of the farmers, but special efforts were made to procure
legislation regulating the railroads. "Down with Monopolies"
was one of the slogans of the Grange. By 1874 the Grange was
2 Central Railroad v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582 (1869).
2 People N% North River Sugar Refining Co., 54 Hun, 354 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1889); State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 46 N. W. 155 (1890).
27 Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Alich. 632, 43 N. W. 1102 (1889) ; Distilling &
Cattle Feeding Co. v. People, 156 Il. 448, 41 N. E. 1S8 (1895).
2
8FAULKNER, A~iuxcIA ECONoiuc HISTORY (1924) 420.
29 For a detailed history of the Grange, see Bucir, THE Gnmi~wms Momvi-
mENT (1913).
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a great national organization claiming a membership of one-half
million farmers and exerting a temporary but powerful political
influence. Between 1873 and 1876 so-called Anti-Monopoly
parties were formed in eleven states and elected many local
candidates. In Illinois, Kansas and California, candidates sup-
ported by the Grange were elected to the United States Senate.
After a bitter fight railroad legislation of a sort was secured
in several of the middle western states. The frightened leaders
of the older parties in these states were compelled to make con-
cessions to the demands of the agriculturists. The fight against
these laws was carried to the Supreme Court of the United
States where in 1876 they were held to be constitutional."
It was obvious, however, that regulations by the states alone
were impracticable, by reason of the difficulty of securing uni-
formity as well as because of the heavy volume of traffic moving
in interstate commerce. As early as 1867 Congress had con-
sidered railroad legislation.31 At one session after another legis-
lation was considered, and the Grange exerted every possible
effort to enforce the enactment of such legislation. East, west
and south joined in this demand. While numerous measures
were considered between 1870 and 1880, no law was passed. The
membership of the Grange was rapidly falling off and its in-
fluence weakening. Temporarily the pressure of the agricultur-
ists for such legislation weakened. Tied up with this agitation
for the regulation of the railroads during the granger movement
were demands for the prevention of restraint of trade. The
labor interests showed a tendency to become interested in the
situation. In 1875 a national labor organization of some
strength, which called itself the order of Sovereigns of Indus-
try, in its constitution declared its intention to present "organ-
ized resistance to the organized encroachments of the monopo-
lies." The significance of the granger movement lay not so much
in its direct accomplishments as in the fact that it established
the power of the states to regulate the rates and practices of the
carriers in intrastate commerce, and by implication the power
of the federal government to do so in interstate commerce. And
it would appear that the agitation caused a general reduction in
rates and a marked change in the attitude of railroad officials
toward the public.2
The next decade, however, saw a far more formidable move-
ment arising out of the ruins of the old. During the eighties
there spread over the southern and western section of the coun-
30 C. B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 (1876); Peik v. C. & N. W. Ry.,
94 U. S. 164 (1876); C. M. & St. P. R. R. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179 (1876);
Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 181 (1876).
31 See BucK, op. cit. supra note 29, at 215.
82 Ibid. 232.
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try another great farmers' organization, known as the National
Farmers' Alliance, 33 which by 1890 claimed a membership of
between three and four million farmers. Several hundred thou-
sand farmers were also organized in a Northwestern Farmers'
Alliance. These organizations demanded, among other measures,
government regulation of railroads and the restriction of patent
rights. The first powerful labor organization, known as the
Knights of Labor, joined the movement demanding government
ownership of railroads. Thus labor and farming interests pre-
sented a formidable demand for railroad legislation. And in the
latter part of the eighties this demand was powerfully supported
by commercial interests and shippers generally. This agitation
resulted in the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act of
1887 forbidding pooling, unreasonable rates and unjust discrimi-
nations. This Act has since been so amended as to give to the
federal government great regulatory powers over all phases of
transportation and has almost entirely eliminated the railroads
as factors in the creation of monopolies of trade.
This prolonged agitation, in which such railroad abuses as the
granting of rebates and gross discriminations in favor of large
shippers were widely discussed, directed attention to the grovh
of great business corporations and created hostility toward them
as potential monopolies. Corporation charters had always been
granted very carefully because of the fear they could be used
as instruments of monopoly, and even a great commercial state
like New York did not permit incorporation under general laws
until 1846.3- Huge industrial enterprises, such as the Sugar
Refineries Company and the Standard Oil Company, which were
in fact obtaining a monopoly of production, aroused the fears
and the prejudices of the people. As these companies had used
the trust agreement as the means of securing a centralized con-
trol, they became popularly known as trusts. At this time a
corporation under existing corporation laws enforced in the
various states did not have the power to acquire stock of another
corporation. So by these trust agreements the capital stock of
competing companies was placed in the hands of trustees for
the benefit of the stockholders of the several companies. In
this way the trustees, controlling the operation and management
of all of the companies, could wholly control competition between
them. In 1879 the Standard Oil trust was formed and it was
soon followed by similar trusts in the whiskey, sugar, cottonseed
oil and other industries. In such basic industries as coal and
steel, pools and pricefixing agreements were common in the
33 Ibid. 302.
34 FAuLxNER, op. cit. supra note 28, at 518.
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seventies and eighties.3 - An investigating committee of the New
York legislature in 1880 unsparingly condemned the Standard
Oil Company.3 6
In the late eighties there arose a widespread demand for the
prohibition of trusts, pools and similar devices to restrain trade.
The opposition to monopoly which had been evident in the plat-
forms of the independent parties now spread to the larger parties
and the platform of the Republican party in 1888 called for
government regulation to prevent monopoly. A committee of
Congress conducted an investigation revealing existing abuses."
President Harrison in a message to Congress in 1888 urged
remedial legislation. The Supreme Court of Michigan, condemn-
ing the match trust in vehement language, said: "Indeed, it is
doubtful if free government can long exist in a country where
such enormous sums of money are allowed to be accumulated in
the vaults of corporations, to be used at discretion in controlling
the property and business of the country against the interest of
the public and that of the people, for the personal gain and
aggrandizement of a few individuals." 81 In the years 1889 and
1890 five states-Maine, Michigan, Tennessee, Texas, Iowa and
Kentucky-enacted statutes prohibiting such combinations or
restraints of trade.
3 9
This agitation within the states was quickly reflected in Con-
gress. It was believed there was no common law enforceable by
the federal government, so that so far as interstate commerce
was concerned the public was unprotected. This was an im-
portant reason for the adoption of a federal statute.41 On Decem-
ber 14, 1889, Senator Sherman of Ohio introduced "A bill to
declare unlawful, trusts and combinations in restraint of trade
and production." 41 This bill was made the basis of congressional
deliberation for months, but on April 2, 1890, a substitute meas-
35 JONES, loc. cit. supra note 21; MOODY, THE MASTERS OF CAPITAL (1920)
45.
36 (1880) NEW YORK ASSEmBLY DOCUMENT No. 38.
17 H. R. REP. No. 9, 50th Cong. 1st Sess., Report on Investigation of
Trusts.
38 Richardson v. Buhl, supra note 27, at 658, 43 N. W. at 1110.
39 The feeling against trade combinations has continued strong, and in
at least thirty states there are statutes against monopolies or combinations
in restraint of trade. DAVIES, op. cit. supra note 23, at 147-150. In twenty-
one states the prohibition against monopoly and restraint of trade is im-
bedded in their constitutions as fundamental law. INDEX DIGEST OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (1915) 1004. At the present time at least thirty-six states
have such a prohibition either in their constitutions or in statutes, and in
all of the other states monopolies and unreasonable restraints of trade are
unlawful at the common law. It is one phase of government regulation in
which the public policy of our states is remarkably uniform.
40 WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW (1910) 33.
41 Ibid. 2.
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woe drawn by Senator Hoar of Iassachusetts was unardro .ii13]
introduced by the Senate Committee on Judiciary and tls bill
was subsequently passed by both Houses and approved by Presi-
dent Harrison on July 2, 1890 . 1
THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT
The Sherman Act prohibits all unreasonable restraints of trade
in interstate and foreign commerce.' The first prohibition of
the law is directed at joint action and declares unlawful every
contract or conspiracy which directly and unreasonably restrains
interstate and foreign commerce."1 No written evidence is neces-
sary, for the existence of any combined action may be implied
from the circumstances and general course of dealing.41 The
second prohibition is aimed primarily at individual action and
makes unlawful any monopoly or attempt to monopolize any part
of interstate or foreign commerce. This prohibition very ma-
terially adds to the act because it applies to individual as well
as to combined action," and because, by reason of the interpreta-
tion of the term "monopoly" by the Supreme Court as synonym-
ous with restraint of trade, the phrase "attempt to monopolize"
42 Ibid. 27, 28.
43 26 Stat. 209, (1890) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 8S20 et scq. Section
1 prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of inter-
state or foreign trade. Section 2 prohibits a monopoly or attempt to mo-
nopolize any part of such commerce. Both of these sections male a viola-
tion of these provisions a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonmut.
Section 3 applies the prohibitions of the first section to the District of
Columbia, and the territories, or to commerce between them or be-tween them
and other states and foreign countries. Section 4 confers jurisdiction on
the circuit courts (now vested in the United States District Courts) to
enforce the law and authorizes proceedings in equity by the government
to prevent and restrain violations of the law. Section 5 authorizes the
court to bring any parties before the court, not named in the proceedings,
when in the opinion of the court the ends of justice Eo require. Section 6
authorizes the seizure and condemnation of property in the course of trans-
portation in interstate commerce, which is the subject matter of any con-
tract, combination, or conspiracy condemned by section 1. Section 7 givcZ
to any person injured by reason of a violation of the law the right to sue
for three-fold damages, costs and attorney's fees. Section 8 defines the
word "person," as used in the act, to include corporations and associationF.
44See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, G0, 31 Sup. Ct. 502,
515 (1911); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 24
Sup. Ct. 436 (1904).
4 Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 208, 41 Sup. Ct. 451
(1921) ; Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United State -, 2$"4
U. S. 600, 608, 34 Sup. Ct. 951, 953 (1914); American Column & Lbr. Co,
v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 400, 42 Sup. Ct. 114, 117 (1921).
46 See dissent in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, mupra note 44,
at 404, 24 Sup. Ct. at 469; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, azp7a note 44,
at 61, 31 Sup. Ct. at 516.
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has come to mean any and all attempts of any nature to effectuate
any unreasonable restraints of trade.47  It may, therefore, be
accurately said that this law prohibits any unreasonable re-
straints of trade or attempts to effectuate such restraints either
by individual or combined action.
To clearly understand this statute it is necessary to determine
just what is an unreasonable restraint of trade. It is of course
impossible to exactly define such a term. But the Supreme
Court, through numerous decisions, has been building up a body
of law which is steadily giving a more exact definition to it.
From these decisions two sources of information are found: (1)
the general principles which have been applied by the courts in
determining the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a re-
straint, (2) the many specified acts which have been condemned
by the court as unreasonable restraints. Here we can consider
only the factors which the courts have discussed in reaching
their determination as to whether or not a particular restraint
was unreasonable. The chief factors thus far discussed by the
courts in considering a particular restraint have been (a) its
effect, (b) its extent, (c) its nature, (d) the methods by which
it was effected, (e) the intent of the parties and (f) the particu-
lar facts existing in the industry.
Effect of restraint. The vital test of the reasonableness of a
restraint of trade is its actual or probable effect upon trade. The
Supreme Court recently has said, "The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates, and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition." 41 "The funda-
mental purpose of the Sherman Act," it stated in another case,
"was to secure equality of opportunity and to protect the public
against the evils commonly incident to the destruction of com-
petition." 49 The types of results which are deemed injurious
to the public are control of prices, 0 control or limitation of pro-
duction,5 1 impairment of quality and lessening of service12 In
other words, where the effect of the restraint is to compel the
47 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, loc. cit. supra note 44.
48 See Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238,
38 Sup. Ct. 242, 244 (1918).
49 See Ramsey Co. v. Bill Posters Ass'n, 260 U. S. 501, 512, 43 Sup. Ct.
167, 168 (1923); United States v. American Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371, 388, 43
Sup. Ct. 607, 611 (1923).
5o See Uinited States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 542, 33 Sup. Ct. 141, 145
(1913) ; United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal Co., 46 Fed. 432, 435 (C. C.
Tenn. 1891).
51 See Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 48, 33
Sup. Ct. 9, 14 (1912); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 Fed.
55, 61 (D. C. N. J. 1915).
62 See United States v. Union Pacific R. R., 226 1. S. 61, 87, 33 Sup. Ct.
53, 58 (1912).
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public to pay a higher price or to accept an inferior article, or to
deprive it of some valuable service, or to withdraw from it a
portion of the supply or to compel a section of the public, such
as laborers or producers, to accept lower prices'for their labor
or commodities than they would secure in an unrestricted market,
such effect condemns the restraint as unreasonable. And where
the restraint is imposed by a combination, as distinguished from
an individual, the court holds such a combination unlawful "when
the necessary tendency is to destroy the kind of competition to
which the public has long looked for protection." ;
The second effect which makes a restraint unreasonable is such
a restriction of the liberty of a trader as will prevent him from
engaging in business or transacting his business in the ordinary
and customary way 4  The courts evince a determination to
preserve equality of opportunity in business for every American.
The law is based, as the courts have said, "on the inherent right
of every individual to choose his own calling in life and to follow
the trade of his choice unhampered by any undue and unfair
interference from others." 5 The fact that a restraint stifles
the Vrade of a competitor makes it not only unreasonable as to
him, but also to the public which has a real interest in securing
the benefits of the initiative and competition of many independ-
ent tradesmen.56 This does not mean that any competitive action
which threatens the elimination of a competitor is unlawful, for
the law recognizes that the inefficient producer must inevitably
pass out of the market by reason of the superiority of the prod-
ucts and service of his more efficient competitors. The elimi-
nation of competitors merely by force of greater efficiency with-
out the use of unfair methods or interference consequently is
not condemned57 It is coercion and interference-things which
the common judgment of mankind condemn as unfair and repre-
hensible-that the law condemns when the rights of an individual
trader are injuriously affected.
Extent of restraint. The extent of the restraint may also be
an important element in determining its unreasonableness,
63 United States v. American Oil Co., supra note 49, at 390, 43 Sup. Ct.
at 611.
61 See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 293, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, 303 (1903);
Addyston Pipe Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 244, 20 Sup. Ct. 90, 103
(1899); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291, 312, 44 Sup. Ct. 96,
100 (1923); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight A&s'n, 1G6 U. S. 230,
323, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, 552 (1897).
6 United States v. Motion Picture Co., 225 Fed. 800, 802 (E. D. Pa.
1915) ; see Northern Securities Co. v. United States, eupra note 4.1, at 341,
24 Sup. Ct. at 459 (1903); Ramsay Co. v. Bill Posters Ass'n, .-zp w note
49, at 512, 43 Sup. Ct. at 168.
56 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, sllpma note 54, at 323,
17 Sup. Ct. at 552.
57 See United States v. Motion Picture Co., loc. cit. supra note 55.
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especially where its full effects are not yet apparent. To judge
of the extent of a restraint, we must consider its extent (a) as
to territory, (b) as to the commodities affected and (c) as to
time. The phrase "any part of the trade or commerce among
the several states or with foreign nations" appearing in the law,
has both a geographical and distributive significance, including
on the one hand a portion of the United States, and on the other
any commodity forming a part of interstate or foreign com-
merce.58
A restraint which is nationwide will obviously be much more
quickly condemned than one which is wholly local. Generally
speaking, the efficiency of transportation, the multitude of dis-
tributors and the existence of substitutes all tend to make at-
tempted local restraints abortive, as the force of outside com-
petition prevents them from becoming effective. It is easily
possible, however, for the dealers in a single city to organize so
as to monopolize trade in that city, and exclude interstate com-
merce from it, in which event the law may be violated."' Or
certain commodities, such as raisins or anthracite coal, may be
produced only within a very restricted area so that restriction
within very small geographical limits might tie up the entire
interstate commerce in the product and thus violate the law."9
The extent of the restraint so far as the supply of the com-
modity itself is affected is much more important. A control of
a large percentage of the trade in a particular commodity is an
indication of violation of the law, and places upon the parties
possessing such control the burden of showing that it was ac-
quired by lawful methods.61 To be a monopoly in violation of
the law, the parties must have a dominating proportion of the
trade in the commodity, or a dominating power over the in-
dustry.6 2 Aside from the question of monopoly, it is necessary
that the restraint apply to a substantial part of interstate com-
merce in the commodity, although such part may be only a small
percentage of the total interstate trade in the product. 3 But
where the restraint indirectly affects only a trivial amount of
us Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 44, at 61, 31 Sup. Ct. at
516.
59 Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 45, 24 Sup. Ct. 307, 309 (1904).
60 United States v. Reading Co., 226 U. S. 324, 33 Sup. Ct. 90 (1912).
61 United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62, 79 (W. D. N. Y.
1915); see Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 391, 394, 25 Sup.
Ct. 276, 277, 278 (1905).
62 See Swift & Co. v. United States, loc. cit. supra note 61; United States
v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 57, 40 Sup. Ct. 425, 432 (1920); United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293 (1920).
63 United States v. Union Pacific R. R., supra note 52, at 88, ,33 Sup. Ct.
at 58; Montague v. Lawry, supra note 59, at 46, 24 Sup. Ct. at 310; United
States v. Whiting, 212 Fed. 466, 474 (D. C. Mass. 1914).
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interstate commerce, the courts refuse to act." In ascertaining
the extent of the control or restraint exercised in an industry,
the courts do not consider substitute materialss or the produc-
tion which the manufacturer himself uses." Different grades
of the same general material are included in determining the
percentage of control.C7 It should also be borne in mind that
where the restraint is one imposed on even a single trader
engaged in interstate commerce by coercion or unwarranted
interference, the question of the extent of his trade becomes
immaterial for the law is determined to preserve his right to
engage in interstate business.
The extent of the restraint as to time, though in ancient times
considered of great importance, need only be noticed in passing.
The courts now hold that for a restraint to be unlawful it need
not be applicable for any protracted period or beyond such a
period as is required to bring in a new supplycs
Nature of restraint. The nature of a proposed restraint of
trade is also a factor to be considered in determining its reason-
ableness. A restraint may be direct or indirect, voluntary or in-
voluntary, or it may affect different forms of competition of
varying importance to the public. The law does not condemn
restraints which are indirect or incidental, but only those which
directly restrain interstate commerce.c0 Thus in labor disputes
where there is an interference with interstate commerce not
within the design of the parties but only indirectly and purely
incidental to the accomplishment of a different purpose, the
courts do not condemn it.7 Similarly the law does not apply the
same test to a voluntary restraint that it does to an involuntary
restraint. A voluntary restraint is one imposed by the parties
on themselves of their own free will, while an involuntary re-
C See Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 2S U. S. 61,
45 Sup. Ct. 403, 408 (1925).
65 O'Halloran v. American Sea Green Slate Co., 207 Fed. 187, 193, 194
(N. D. N. Y. 1913).
ra United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859, 899, 900 (D. C. Md.
1916).
6 See Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 107 Fed. 701, 7::1 (W. ,
Mich. 1908).
Cs United States v. Patten, supra note 50; see United States v. Corn
Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964, 1012 (S. D. N. Y. 191); Lee Line
Steamers v. Memphis H. & R. Packet Co., 277 Fed. 5, 3 (C. C. A. 6th,
1922).
6c See Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 615, 19 Sup. Ct. 50, 54
(1898); Swift & Co. v. United States, smpra note 61, at 396, 25 Sup. Ct.
at 279; Field v. Asphalt Co., 194 U. S. 618, G23, 24 Sup. Ct. 784, 780
(1904); United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S.
457, 471, 44 Sup. Ct. 623, 627 (1924).
- See Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United Statc-:. ',III;' nt C1,
at 81, 82, 83, 45 Sup. Ct. at 407, 408; United Leather Workers v. Herkert
& Meisel Trunk Co., supra note 69, at 471, 44 Sup. Ct. at 027.
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stiaint is one which imposes restrictions on others against their
will.71- If the restraint is a voluntary one the law is concerned
only with its effects, or probable effects, on the general public
which must be substantial before the law intervenes. If the
restraint is an involuntary one, however, even though it threatens
the existence of only a single competitor it will be almost cer-
tainly condemned for the purpose of the law, and the determi-
nation of the courts is to protect every Business man in his right
to engage in business.72 The type of competition which the re-
straint is designed to affect may also have some bearing on its
reasonableness. Restrictions of any kind on competition in
price are of dubious legality for the determination of price under
the free-play of supply and demand is the basis of the competi-
tive system. Restrictions on other forms of competition might
not be so important, and in some instances might be of a nature
clearly benefiting the public and all competitors, as for example,
a program of standardization of the products of an industry.
The law looks with disfavor on restraints of competition in buy-
ing as well as of competition in selling.73  It is possible, however,
that courts may look with less critical eyes on restrictions on
competition in buying, where such restrictions ultimately result
in lower prices to the public on the finished product. The courts
seem to make no real distinction between actual or potential com-
petition, condemning any unreasonable restraint of either. 4
Methods used. The methods used to accomplish the restraint
are receiving increasing consideration by the courts in determin-
ing unreasonableness." Where fair, normal methods of doing
business are used, the courts seem more and more inclined to
hold the acquirement of a considerable control over competition
is not unlawful so long as such control does not become so great
as to wield a dominating power over the entire industry.10 De-
spite the express wording of the statute prohibiting any mo-
71See United States v. Patten, supra note 50, at 541, 33 Sup. Ct. at 144,
145; Loewe v. Lawlor, supra note 54, at 293, 294, 28 Sup. Ct. at 303;
Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup. Ct. 492
(1911).
72 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 307, 39 Sup. Ct. 465,
468 (1919).
7 See United States v. Whiting, supra note 63, at 477; Swift & Co. v.
United States, supra note 61, at 399, 25 Sup. Ct. at 280.
4 See United States v. Colgate & Co., loc. cit. supra note 72; United
States v. Reading Co., supra note 60, at 369, 370, 33 Sup. Ct. at 103; Thom-
son v. Union Castle S. S. Co., 166 Fed. 251, 253 (C. C. A, 2d, 1908).
'7 See United States v. Reading Co., supra note 60, at 370, 33 Sup. Ct. at
103; United States v. Union Pacific R. R., supra note 52; Board of Trade
of Chicago v. United States, loc. cit. supra note 48.
TO United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., supra note 62, at 446, 447, 40 Sup.
Ct. at 297, 298; United States v. Reading Co., supra note 60, at 352, 33
Sup. Ct. at 97.
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nopoly or attempt to monopolize any part of interstate com-
merce, it is possible to interpret recent decisions of the Supreme
Court as holding that an individual concern may acquire a practi-
cal monopoly if no unfair methods are used in acquiring it.7.
This is a more or less logical result of their decision in the
Stanudard Oil case, holding that the words "monopoly" or "at-
tempt to monopolize" merely mean "unreasonable restraint of
trade." But where the methods employed are not the fair ordi-
nary methods of winning trade, but are obviously intended to
work against the interests of the public and to unduly restrict
the rights of competitors, their use alone will make the plan
unlawful.71 Typical of such questionable methods are those in-
volving fraud, coercion, intimidation and improper interference
with the business of a competitor. What would be normal and
fair methods for a smaller concern, when employed by a great
corporation with the intention of acquiring a monopoly, may
become unfair and abnormal because of their far-reaching effect
in eliminating competition.- Obviously a practice, such as price
discrimination, when utilized by a weak concern might have no
effect, but if employed by a powerful concern against weak com-
petitors, would drive them out of business. What the Supreme
Court calls the "deliberate, calculated purchase for control" is
not deemed a fair method.7 0
Intent. Intent is, of course, extremely difficult to prove. But
the men participating in a restraint well know its purpose, and
their own conscience, therefore, is a rather accurate measure of
the lawfulness of any proposed plan. Intent in Sherman law
cases is important only in that class of cases where the actual
restraint or power to restrain has not yet been secured. Where
an intention to acquire monopoly or control price is shown, the
court is in a better position to interpret the facts and forecast
their consequences, and will not hesitate to enjoin the continu-
ance of a plan in order to fully protect the public.S' The intent
creates a dangerous probability of the restraint being effected
which warrants action by the court in the public interest. 2 Ap-
77 See United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., supra note 62, at 440-453, 40
Sup. Ct. at 297-299; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247
U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct. 473 (1918).
Ts Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 44, at 58, 31 Sup. Ct. at
515.
7 See United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 203 Fed. 733, 7.4 (N. D.
Ohio, 1913); United States v. Reading Co., szpra note 60, at 370, 33 Sup.
Ct. at 103.
o0United States v. Reading Co., oc. cit. svpra note 62.
81 See Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, loc. cit. supra note
48; United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., loc. cit. Supra
note 69.
82 United States v. Swift & Co., supra note 61.
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parently the Supreme Court requires something more than proof
of an unlawful intent; their use of the term "probable effective
intent" would indicate the existence of a probable ability to effect
the restraint.
83
But in the class of cases where the restraint has been effected
and substantially restricts competition, proof of intent is un-
necessary for it could be presumed from the control exercised or
methods used.84 It is the existence of the unreasonable restraint,
or the power to unreasonably restrain, which is the vital thing
and even the best of intentions is no defense or justification.
Many fine purposes have been assigned for restraints effected,
but in every case the courts have brushed such purposes aside
where a public injury appeared.85 Nevertheless in recent cases
involving interference with interstate commerce, where the com-
merce affected was not very substantial, and there was clearly
no direct intention to interfere with it, the Supreme Court has
seemed to give considerable weight to the intention of the
parties.8
Unique facts. In determining the reasonableness of a re-
straint in a particular industry, it is necessary also to consider
any special or peculiar facts existing in that industry which may
properly bear on the question. For example, in the Window
Glass Manufacturers' case,87 it was shown that hand glass blow-
ing was a dying industry, that the machine production fixed the
price, that the glass blowers had been drawn to other industries
and there were not enough blowers to man all of the factories
during the working season. The hand glass blowers' union and
the association of manufacturers of hand blown glass entered
into an agreement whereby the factories were divided into two
3 United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., supra note 69,
at 467, 44 Sup. Ct. at 626.
84 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 44, at 75, 76, 31
Sup. Ct. at 520, 521; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, supra
note 56, at 340, 17 Sup. Ct. at 558; United States v. Reading Co., loc. cit.
supra note 60; Swift & Co. v. United States, supra note 61, at 397, 25
Sup. Ct. at 279; United States v. Terminal R. R. Assn., 224 U. S. 383,
395, 32 Sup. Ct. 507, 510 (1912); United States v. Patten, supra note 50,
at 543, 33 Sup. Ct. at 145.
85 United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., supra note 79, at 744; Stand-
ard Sanifary Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra note 51, at 49, 33 Sup. Ct.
at 15; United States v. Union Pacific R. R., supra note 52, at 93, 33 Sup. Ct.
at 60; Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 613,
34 Sup. Ct. 951, 954, 955 (1914); United States v. Motion Pictures Co.,
supra note 55, at 808; Thomson v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66, 85, 86, 37 Sup. Ct.
353, 359 (1917).
86 See Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, supra note CA,
at 81, 83, 45 Sup. Ct. at 406, 407; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal
Co., 259 U. S. 344, 411, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 583 (1922).
87 National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfgrs. v. United States, 263 U. S.
403, 44 Sup. Ct. 148 (1923).
LAW OF BUSINESS COMPETITION
groups, each group being permitted to operate only part of the
time, during which time the other group remained idle, the shlort
supply of laborers being shifted between the factories. The
Supreme Court held the legality of such an agreement must be
determined by the particular facts, and in consideration of the
unique facts existing in this trade held that the agreement was
not an unreasonable restraint of trade. Again in the Qt.a:Lcr
Oats case, the court gave great weight to the unlimited supply
of raw material available and the fact that only a small capital
was required to enter the business, thus viewing potential com-
petition a very powerful factor, making improbable any injury
to the public from increased prices.'s In the Aincrican Cai case
the court also considered the ease with which new competitors
with small capital might enter the field if any attempt were made
to exact high prices from the public." On the other hand, if
the business concern is a quasi-public employment, and practi-
cally a monopoly by reason of peculiar facts, the courts would
probably scrutinize much more closely any joint action than it
would where the parties were ordinary commercial competitors
subject to the force of the competition of many other direct com-
petitors. 0
Thus through the years the federal courts have been building
up a body of principles which in a measure help to clarify the
meaning of the phrase "ureasonable restraint of trade." Of
much greater effect in clarifying the situation, however, have
been the numerous decisions of the courts declaring many prac-
tices to be unlawful. It may, therefore, be truly said that the
lawv is acquiring definiteness and certainty.
ENFORCEMENT OF THE SHERMAN LAW
The enforcement of the Sherman Law was started vigorously.
In the latter part of 1890, injunction proceedings were brought
against a combination of coal operators, known as the Nashville
Coal Exchange, and an injunction secured., Criminal prosecu-
tions were instituted against different officials of the alleged
whiskey trust, but the lower courts held the indictments faulty
or ruled that the prohibition of the law was directed only toward
an absolute monopoly.2- In a criminal action brought against a
lumber combination, a demurrer to the indictment was sustained
38 United States v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 Fed. 499, 502 (N. D. IMI. 191G).
89 United States v. American Can Co., supra note 6, at 900.
90 United States v. Whiting, supra note 63, at 475; see United States v.
Prince Line, 220 Fed. 230, 232 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
91 United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal Co., suzpra note 50.
9
21n re Corning, 51 Fed. 205 (N. D. Ohio, 1892); In re Greene, 52 Fed.
104 (S. D. Ohio, 1892).
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on the ground that an agreement restraining trade was not un-
lawful unless it "involves an absorption of the entire traffic in
lumber, and is entered into for the purpose of obtaining the
entire control of it with the object of extortion." 93 Even in the
famous Trans-Missouri Freight Association case, the lower
federal court held an agrement between the railroads to fix rates,
under the circumstances presented, was not an unreasonable
restraint of trade.9 4 Other cases brought by the government and
individuals usually ended in similar fashion. These discourag-
ing results, together with the business depression of 1893 and
the unfriendliness of some Attorney Generals toward the policy
of the law, made the act appear to be a failure so far as reach-
ing trade combinations was concerned.
The act, however, was applied effectively against labor organi-
zations. It was successfully invoked to break a railroad strike
in New Orleans, 5 and a few months later its provisions were
enforced to break up the great railroad strike which was
threatening to paralyze business over the country. 0
The Supreme Court in 1895 itself temporarily destroyed the
restraining influence of the statute when in the Knight case it
held that the acquisition of refineries by the American Sugar
Refining Company, even though it had given this company a
monopoly of the manufacture of sugar in the country, was not
within the reach of federal action because manufacture was not
commerce and a monopoly of manufacture affected interstate
commerce only indirectly and incidentally. The government
failed to offer any evidence showing any steps by the parties
with intent to restrain interstate commerce, and it is upon this
ground alone that the Supreme Court has subsequently justified
the decision.91 This decision, business men and lawyers believed,
gave them a free hand in forming holding companies, mergers
and similar consolidations of producing plants. As a result,
during the last half of the nineties, there was a great scramble
for the consolidation of competing concerns. Many of our great-
est business organizations were created during this period, either
through the device of the holding company or by merger. Huge
promotion profits, over-capitalization and similar abuses were
93 United States v. Nelson, 52 Fed. 646, 647 (D. Minn. 1892).
04 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 53 Fed. 440 (C. C.
Kan. 1892).
95 United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994
(E. D. La. 1893).
Ds United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (1894); Thomas v. Cincinnati, N.
0. & T. P. Ry., 62 Fed. 803 (S. D. Ohio, 1894); United States v. Aglor,
ibid. 824 (C. C. Ind. 1894).
97 United States v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 249 (1895).
98 United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., supra note 69,
at 469, 44 Sup. Ct. at 626.
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common. The movement quickly aroused widespread appre-
hension throughout the country. In 1892, the Massachusetts
legislature adopted resolutions urging Congress to adopt laws
"effectually to prevent such combinations and destroy such mo-
nopolies" as the anthracite coal combine. The Democratic party,
in its platforms of 1896 and 1900, inveighed against trusts and
monopolies. In 1897 the New York State legislature, through
a committee, made an investigation of great combinations in
the sugar, rubber and wall paper industries and enacted an
anti-trust law.93 Numerous other states during this period
adopted similar legislation often more stringent than the federal
statute. Congress, in 1898, appointed the Industrial Commis-
sion to investigate various industrial problems, including corpo-
ration evils and the trusts. The investigations and report of
the commission aroused widespread interest. Its chief recom-
mendation was for the establishment of some agency in the
federal government which would give widespread publicity to
the improper practices of corporations and trade combinations,
thus acting as a deterrent.
The first few years of the twentieth century witnessed a
powerful attack upon the large corporations. This was the hey-
day of the special magazine writer lnown as the "muckraker."
Articles by writers, such as Ida Tarbell, powerfully pictured
existing abuses. In 1902, President Roosevelt began an energetic
attack on the trusts which quickly secured public support and
resulted in legislation.
In 1903, the Expediting Act"1 0 was enacted wlich gave priority
in the federal courts to cases arising under the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act and the Interstate Commerce Act, thus making possi-
ble quicker action for the correction of conditions by the courts.
The Elkins Act' ' was also passed, designed primarily to destroy
the practice of rebating by the railroads which, by granting re-
bates to the large combinations controlling a heavy volume of
traffic, were driving the smaller concerns out of business. The
third law providing for the creation of a federal bureau of
corporations, o2 marked a great advance in the enforcement of
the law.
Bureau of Corporations. The Bureau of Corporations was.
created largely as a result of the recommendations of the Indus-
trial Commission and Attorney General Knox, and the vigorous
support given the measure by the President. This Bureau was
made a part of the Department of Commerce and Labor. It was
99 REPORT OF JOINT Comirr=E OF SENATE AND AssEiMBLY, STA-E OF N-%V
YORK, March 9, 1897, No. 40.
100 32 Stat 823, (1903) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) §§ 8824, 8S25.
101 32 Stat. 847, (1903) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) §§ 8597-84599.
102 (1903) 32 Stat 825, 827, 828.
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given the power to investigate the organization, conduct and
management of corporations and combinations engaged in inter-
state commerce, other than common carriers, and to make reports
to the president concerning them, which reports were to be pub-
lished according to the president's directions. Incidental powers,
such as the right of subpoena, and to compel production of
books and records, were also given to make the power of investi-
gation effective. This act marks the second important step in
the federal regulation of business combinations for it added
publicity as a means for discouraging improper activities, and
it created a fact-finding body to make scientific studies of differ-
ent industries, with a view of aiding the Department of Justice
in necessary prosecutions and of making recommendations for
constructive changes in the law should the need arise. The
bureau made a number of important investigations of different
industries, and its reports resulted in some of the most im-
portant prosecutions ever instituted under the Sherman Law.
Publicity without prosecution was of itself a restraining influ-
ence; because the great corporations which depended upon the
good will of the public both for their finances and for the maxi-
mum distribution of their goods, dreaded unfavorable publicity.
Publicity took, its place beside prosecution as a means of dis-
couraging restraints of trade. The fault of the previous system
of legal proceedings, as Theodore Roosevelt phrased it, was that,
"It entirely fails to give the publicity which is one of the best
by-products of the system of control by administrative officials;
publicity, which is not only good in itself, but furnishes the data
for whatever further action may be necessary."
Strengthening of the law by the Supreme Court. The de-
cisions of the Supreme Court added strength to the statute. In
a few earlier decisions when public feeling was strong, the court
had read real meaning into the law.10 3 These decisions, however,
involved such practices as agreements to fix prices or to restrict
production concerning the illegality of which there could be little
dispute. In 1904 the court delivered its famous decision in the
Northern Securities Company case, declaring that company,
which was a holding company designed to control competition
between two great trans-continental railroad systems serving
the northwest, to be an unlawful combination in restraint of
trade.10 4 This device, which had furnished a simple method of
quickly effecting monopolistic combinations, had been very
popular, generally supplanting the trust agreement which had
been held to be unlawful by various state courts. This decision
103 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, supra note 56; United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505, 19 Sup. Ct. 25 (1898); Addys-
ton Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, supra note 54.
204 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, supra note 44.
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strongly deterred combinations of this character and forced
efforts to restrain trade ihto the more ineffective forms of
"gentlemen's agreements," tacit understandings and similar de-
vices, except where it was possible to merge the properties of
competing corporations into a single corporation-a task often
involving many legal complications. The effect of the decision
was also greatly to encourage government prosecuting and in-
vestigating agencies, and to stimulate legal proceedings by the
government.
Popular feeling against the trusts, particularly in the south-
ern and western states, continued to be strong. President Taft
in 1910 and 1911 urged a voluntary federal incorporation law
with provisions against over-capitalization and holding com-
panies.1 :5 Very important proceedings brought by the govern-
ment during this period were terminated by the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the Standiad Oil and Americau Tobacco Com-
piany cases in 1911, which as a whole strengthened the law. The
holding company was again condemned, and in the latter case
the court found a merger of properties of competing concerns
which operated in unreasonable restraint of trade to be unlaw-
ful.20
6 The court not only ordered the dissolution of these great
combinations, but also in forceful language stated that the law
was not to be evaded by "any subterfuge or indirection."
At the same time in these cases the court introduced the famous
rule of reason, holding that the law prohibited only unreasonable
restraints of trade. In previous decisions the court had held the
law prohibited all restraints of trade, and it now franldy re-
versed its position. This action was condemned by prominent
members of Congress as judicial legislation, and the decisions
caused widespread discussion, again focusing attention on the
problem. No action, however, was taken by Congress and the
interpretation given by the court still stands as the law of the
land. It has, beyond doubt, resulted in considerable confusion
and uncertainty as predicted by Justice Harlan, but the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts have since rendered numerous
decisions, which are clarifying and defining the meaning of the
term. The dissolution decrees were severely condemned at the
time as being wholly ineffective. While their effects were not
noticeable for a few years, there is no doubt that the tobacco
decree ultimately restored competition in that industry. And
the oil decree has very probably restricted the use of unfair
methods by the companies created under the dissolution decree,
thus giving a fair opportunity for independent concerns to de-
velop their enterprises as they have very successfully done dur-
105 MESSAGES TO CONGRESS, January 7, 1910, December 5, 1911.
o6 United States v. Standard Oil Co., -z.pra note 44; United State3 v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (1911).
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ing the remarkable expansion of the industry in recent years.
In a number of decisions up to the present time the Supreme
Court, with a very few exceptions arising out of particularly
difficult facts, has rigorously applied the prohibitions of the law
in cases coming before it. Beginning with the Roosevelt adminis-
tration there has been a steady presentation of cases by the
Department of Justice to the federal courts for determination.
In recent years there has also been an increasing use by the
government of criminal proceedings, and not only heavy fines
but sentences of imprisonment have been secured. The Sherman
Act has become a powerful restraining influence against mo-
nopoly and restraint of trade in the world of business.
Interesting evidence as to public sentiment at the time is con-
tained in the report entitled "The Trust Problem" issued by the
National Civic Federation in 1912. This organization sent out
questionnaires to thousands of manufacturers, bankers, labor
leaders, educators, professional men and other prominent citi-
zens, asking their opinion as to various phases of the trust
problem.107 The replies indicated that there was strong senti-
ment for the clarification of the Sherman law by definition, and
for a more effective control of corporations through national in-
corporation or license laws as well as by the creation of a
Federal Trade Commission. And at the same time there was an
equally strong sentiment against excepting labor or farmer com-
binations from the prohibitions of the law.
107 Some sixteen thousand answers were received, the first thousand being
carefully tabulated and the results of such tabulation checked against the
remaining fifteen thousand answers to assure that the tabulation of the
first thousand answers was fairly representative of the whole. The ques-
tionnaire and the results as tabulated were as follows:
1. Do you believe that the Sherman Law, as now interpreted, is made
clear and workable? Yes, 192; no, 841.
2. Do you consider it feasible to attempt to return to what are com-
monly known as old competitive methods in business? Yes, 181; no, 881.
3. Do you favor a repeal of the Sherman Law? Yes, 379; no, 600.
4. Do you favor amending the Sherman Law in any way? Yes, 585;
no, 149.
5. Should railroads be allowed to enter into agreements affecting rates,
subject to the approval and regulation of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission? Yes, 975; no, 63.
6. Should trade unions be excepted from the operation of the Sherman
Act? Yes, 102; no, 962.
7. Should combinations of farmers, either to restrict production or to
hold the crop for 'higher prices, be rendered lawful under the Sherman
Act? Yes, 209; no, 828.
8. Do you favor a national incorporation law? Yes, 757; no, 191.
9. Do you favor a federal license law? Yes, 451; no, 294.
10. Do you favor an interstate trade commission, with powers not un-
like those now enjoyed by the Interstate Commerce Commission in relation
to common carriers? Yes, 614; no, 278.
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The Democratic party in 1912 made the prevention of mo-
nopoly and the correction of corporate abuses a major plank in
its platform. Woodrow Wilson, in speeches throughout the
country, emphasized the necessity for more effective control, and
with his election to the presidency additional legislation became
inevitable.
Pawuma Cunw1 Act. In the latter part of 1912 before the
Democratic party came into power, Congrcess adopted an act
providing for the maintenance and operation of the Panama
Canal, in which, as a further safeguard to the public, it was
provided that no vessel engaged in coastwise or foreign trade
of the United States should be permitted to pass through the
canal if such ship were owned, chartered, operated or controlled
by any parties doing business in violation of the several anti-
trust acts already mentioned.10 s
Anti-trust provisions of Wilson Tariff Act. In 1913, the Wil-
son Tariff Act of 1894 was amended so as to include prohibitions
framed in imitation of the Sherman law, declaring illegal all
combinations, conspiracies and agreements between parties, any
one of whom is engaged in importing any article from any for-
eign country into the United States, when intended to operate in
restraint of lawful trade or free competition, or to increase the
market price in any part of the United States of any article im-
ported or intended to be imported, or of any manufacture into
which such imported article entered or is intended to enter.
1 -
A violation of the act was made a misdemeanor and the courts
were given power to restrain violation. Property owned under
any contract, or by any combination or party to any conspiracy
violating the act, was made subject to seizure and condemnation
and any party injured in his business or property was given the
right to three-fold damages. This law remained for years a
dead letter, but it was this provision which was recently called
into life by the government in its unsuccessful injunction pro-
ceedings against the sugar exchange.'"
It was not until 1914, however, that President Wilson was able
to give real consideration to this problem. More urgent legisla-
tion, such as the Federal Reserve Act, occupied the attention of
Congress. At the request of the President, Joseph E. Davies,
United States Commissioner of Corporations, in 1913 prepared
for his confidential use a survey of laws regulating business
108 37 Stat. 560, (1912) U. S. Camp Stat. (1916) § 8836.
109 37 Stat. 667, (1913) U. S. Camp. Stat. (1916) §§ 8831, 8834, amending
28 Stat. 570, (1894) U. S. Camp. Stat. (1916) §§ 8831-8S35.
110 United States v. Coffee and Sugar Exchange, 263 U. S. 611, 44 Sup.
Ct. 225 (1924).
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enacted by the more important nations of the world, and sum-
marized the opinions of leading citizens as publicly expressed on
the subject during the preceding decade. On January 20, 1914,
President Wilson delivered his message before Congress on
"Trusts and Monopolies," outlining a program which was over
a year later enacted into a law by Congress in two important
laws, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
(To be concluded)
